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We assess the role of equity markets in the transmission of monetary policy in the EU. We use a 
structural VAR model based upon the models of Kim and Roubini [2000] and Brischetto and Voss 
[1999] and we find that there are differences in monetary policy transmission across our sample of 
countries. The largest output losses following a monetary shock are seen in a core of euro area 
countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, and Germany. Germany also displays the largest 
response of prices and is followed by Austria and Finland. Variance decompositions also suggest 
that the bank based core euro area countries are different from market based countries. As regards 
the channels of transmission we find no evidence to suggest an equity wealth effect channel in the 
euro area and only circumstantial evidence for the UK. We do, however, find that those countries 
that use equity finance (the UK and the Netherlands) suffer smaller output losses following a 
monetary shock indicating that a bank lending channel is less likely to be present in these 
countries. 
 
Keywords: monetary policy, equity markets, VAR modelling. 
JEL Classifications: E44, E52, G15 
 
(also downloadable) in electronic version: http://som.rug.nl/ 
                                                     
*
 Elbourne is at University of Groningen, The Netherlands. Salomons is at University of 
Groningen and AEGON Asset Management, The Netherlands. Correspondence: 
a.elbourne@eco.rug.nl. The comments of Jakob de Haan, Jürgen von Hagen, Dale Henderson, Jan 
Jacobs, Jan Kakes, Soyoung Kim, Gerard Kuper, Elmer Sterken, Carl Walsh, seminar participants 
at the NAKE Research Day 2002 and 2003, at the Bonn workshop on monetary policy and at the 
SOM 2003 workshop on monetary transmission and financial structure at the University of 
Groningen are appreciated. 
 2
1. INTRODUCTION 
The deepening economic and political integration in Europe has spawned a large body of 
literature and a lively debate on how the European Central Bank should govern monetary 
policy. As Guiso, Kashyap, Panetta and Terlizzese [1999] pointed out, there are three 
conditions that have to be met to effectively run a common monetary policy: 1) 
agreement on ultimate goals, 2) similar business cycles, and 3) the transmission 
mechanism must operate in a similar way across countries. The Maastricht Treaty covers 
the first condition, but the other two are still open for discussion. 
The modern credit view of monetary policy transmission stresses that financial 
structure differences may lead to differing transmission mechanisms because different 
financial structures allow firms different access to external financing of projects. Various 
authors have argued that these differences lead to substantial differences in monetary 
policy transmission across EMU countries. In what is probably one of the best-known 
studies in this area, Cecchetti [1999] argues that:  
 
“Most economists believe that the monetary transmission mechanism will vary 
systematically across countries with differences in the size, concentration, and 
health of the banking system, and with differences in the availability of primary 
capital market financing. The countries of the EU differ quite dramatically in all 
of these dimensions that would seem to matter, leading to the prediction that the 
impact of interest rates on output and prices will not be consistent across 
countries. While the estimates of the impact of interest rate changes on output 
and inflation tend to be quite imprecise, they do differ, and in the way that is 
predicted by the state of the countries’ financial systems.” (Cecchetti [1999], p. 
22). 1  
                                                     
1
 In contrast, summarising a large project on differences in monetary transmission across euro area 
countries, the ECB concludes in its Monthly Bulletin of October 2002 that the empirical evidence 
does not suggest that there are systematic differences between countries in policy transmission that 
are robust across different studies and methodologies. See Mojon and Peersman [2001] and 
Angeloni, Kashyap, Mojon and Terlizzese [2001] for further details. For a discussion of the results 
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The extent to which monetary transmission works differently across the EU is 
critical for the ability of the ECB to run a single policy; hence most literature has 
focussed on heterogeneity among markets in the EU. A Bank for International 
Settlements [1995] study first focused on differences in financial structure within the EU 
and found marked differences in transmission with the UK suffering the largest output 
loss after a monetary contraction and Spain the smallest. Kashyap and Stein [1997] 
examine the role of banks in European monetary policy and find that banks play an 
important role in transmission in Italy and Germany, whilst credit markets are more 
important in the Netherlands. Clements, Kontolemis and Levy [2001] focus on 
differences in transmission and claim that the textbook interest rate channel accounts for 
the majority of the differences in transmission.  2 There is still no general consensus in the 
literature, however. 
In this paper we investigate differences arising from the role of equity markets in 
transmission: higher asset prices can boost spending; hence, equity is a suitable candidate 
for propagating monetary policy to target variables (see Mishkin [2001]). We focus on 
two main questions: Firstly, are there differences in transmission? Secondly, if there are 
differences, what causes them?  
The following section will review the literature focussing on the role of equity in 
the transmission of monetary policy and the impact it has on growth and inflation. 
Section 2 also reviews features of the institutions of the EU countries of relevance to the 
transmission mechanism. Banks tend to dominate the financial system in Europe, though 
there are substantial differences between countries. Section 3 gives a description of the 
data. Section 4 details our structural vector autoregression (SVAR) modelling strategy, 
and section 5 our main testing results. We concern ourselves with several questions. 
                                                                                                                                                 
of simulations with econometric models of national central banks, see Van Els, Locarno, Morgan 
and Villetelle [ 2001]. 
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Firstly, do we find differences in the monetary transmission in the countries? Secondly, 
can we link these differences in transmission with the heterogeneity of the financial 
systems? Finally, is there evidence of an equity channel? Before summarizing and 
concluding, section 6 looks at the implications of our results.  
 
2. MONETARY TRANSMISSION: THE ROLE OF EQUITY 
The equity channel 
We need to separate two broad aspects of the literature on monetary policy and financial 
markets to discuss the equity channel. First, the impact of monetary policy on asset prices 
and secondly, how asset prices affect the central bank’s target variables: output and 
prices. There is a broad consensus on the way monetary policy affects asset prices, 
especially equity: lower interest rates generally improves the prospects for equity and 
results in a higher price level. The affect of equity prices on output and inflation are less 
clear. 
For the impact of asset prices on output, most researchers have focussed on 
investment and consumption. In the case of investment, rising equity prices lower the cost 
of new capital relative to existing capital. Following Tobin’s [1969] Q theory of 
investment this spurs investment. The theoretical foundation of the lending view of 
Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist [1999] focuses on the intermediation role of banks and 
capital market imperfections. 3 Deflationary monetary policy may decrease a firm’s net 
worth and in turn affect the firm’s ability to raise external finance. The lower the firm’s 
net worth the more severe the adverse selection and moral hazard problems are in lending 
                                                                                                                                                 
2
 This is calculated as the residual from a regression after the exchange rate and credit channels 
have been accounted for. 
3
 Empirical evidence suggests that financial imbalances drive changes in investment (see Fazzari, 
Hubbard and Petersen [1988]). Kashyap and Stein [1995] show that bank lending is important for 
the US. Similar conclusions can be drawn for the UK (see Dale and Haldane [1995]) and the 
Netherlands (see Garretsen and Swank [1998]). 
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to this firm, thus restricting external finance and investment. For consumption, Ludvigson 
and Steindel [1999] have found the household wealth effect is strong in the US. But this 
wealth effect view is controversial because housing wealth is greater for most than equity 
market wealth. House prices are, therefore, considered to be more important than equity 
for consumption (see Makin and Palumbo [2001]). Recent evidence from the IMF [2002] 
shows the robustness of wealth effects in other markets with the equity wealth effect in 
market based financial systems larger than in bank based systems. Secondly, higher 
equity prices signal financial markets expectations of faster output growth in the future; 
individuals’ expectations of wage income, and therefore their willingness to spend, 
should follow. Thirdly, liquidity effects in household balance sheets and a lower 
probability of financial distress will result in increased consumer spending. 
In contrast to the effects on economic growth, the effect of asset prices on 
inflation is less well researched. Rapidly rising equity and housing prices in the late 
1990s have heightened concerns that inflationary pressures are building even though 
there has been only modest growth in conventional price indicators. Studying the major 
industrialised countries (G7), Stock and Watson [2003] find that asset prices are less 
predictive as a leading indicator for inflation than for output. For the same set of countries 
Goodhart and Hofmann [2001] find positive impulse responses for growth, but puzzling 
responses of inflation to equity prices and suggest that the forward looking behaviour of 
equity prices is to blame. As inflationary pressures arise via excess aggregate demand, 
one would expect more evidence on the leading indicator properties of asset prices. 
Bryan, Cecchetti and O’Sullivan [2002] support the view that the impact of asset prices 
on inflation is limited, but claim that the failure to include asset prices in the aggregate 
price statistic for the US has introduced a downward bias. 
A major obstacle for this line of research is the forward-looking nature of equity: 
do higher equity prices boost investment and consumption or are they merely indicating 
that future output and consumption, and hence profits, are going to be higher? 
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European financial structure 
Rajan and Zingales [2003] (Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix) provide an indication of 
differences in financial development between countries in Europe and contrast it with the 
US and UK data. Not surprisingly, in 1980 bank deposits were more important in 
Continental Europe than in the Anglo-American countries: bank deposits relative to GDP 
were 60% larger. The reverse was true for equity markets. Market capitalisation to GDP 
was one fifth of that of the US and the UK. A similar picture arises from the amount of 
equity raised and the number of publicly traded companies (after correcting for 
Luxembourg). Differences between the 1980 and 2000 data are striking. Spectacular 
returns on equity over the last two decades of the previous century have raised market 
capitalisation to GDP in the market-oriented US by a factor 3. The growth in Continental 
Europe was even more pronounced: the ratio went up more than 13 times. Equity 
issuance also rose substantially. The gap between the Anglo-American markets and 
Continental Europe still exists: European firms are more reliant on bank loans than those 
of the US, but it is clearly reduced.  
The composition of external finance (Table A3) corroborates the bank dominance 
in Europe. It also shows that while equity finance has matured, corporate bond markets 
are still in a juvenile stage when compared to the US.   
 
3. DESCRIPTION OF DATA 
Variables 
We use eight variables to look at the transmission mechanism: prices, output, a short term 
domestic interest rate, a short term foreign (US) interest rate, the money supply, the level 
of the equity market, the nominal exchange rate, and commodity prices. 4 The first four 
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 In our empirical studies we also ran models using the German interest rates as the foreign interest 
rate. Only for a few smaller markets was there any meaningful difference. We argue that this is 
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variables are standard in the type of VAR research conducted. Inclusion of nominal 
exchange rate captures the differences in trade channels between countries. Moreover, it 
stems from the observation that in the early 1990s, there was still considerable 
speculation whether or not some countries would join the monetary union (e.g. in 
September of 1992, the pound sterling was under speculative attack and, after defending 
the pound by raising interest rates, the UK was eventually forced out). We would argue 
that at least part of monetary policy was externally focussed at the time. Commodity 
prices are included to control for the price puzzle in the VAR studies. 
In our study we evaluate eight countries for which the ECB currently conducts 
monetary policy: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and 
Spain. As Sweden and the UK are potential candidates for entry, we add these countries 
to our set. For a broader sample we also include the US.  
 
Data 
Our sample period begins in January 1980 until December 2002. 5 Not all countries have 
all data available at all times; Sweden starts in February 1982. Economic data are all from 
the International Financial Statistics database at the IMF. The money market rate is the 
monetary variable included for short-term interest rates that are controlled by the central 
bank. Money supply is narrow money, M1 or broad money, M3. As proxy for economic 
activity we have taken Industrial Production. CPI is the relevant price index. Equity 
market data are Datastream total return indices. In case the total return series in 
Datastream were unavailable or had a short sample period, the equity price series from 
                                                                                                                                                 
because our models include equity markets where the US interest rates tends to be the dominant 
factor. 
5
 In order to take the realignment of the ERM into account, which occurred between 1980 and 
1982, we tested for robustness by changing the sample period in the empirical study. Dropping the 
first years in the study did not change the results. 
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IFS were used (Finland and Spain). Commodity prices are the Commodity Research 
Bureau spot price index.  
 
Statistical analysis of data 
Before our empirical analysis, we test for stationarity and seasonality of the series. We 
take logarithms for prices, output, equity, nominal exchange rates and commodity prices. 
A battery of Augmented Dickey Fuller tests reveals that most series are integrated of 
order one. These results are confirmed by KPSS (of Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and 
Shin [1992]) statistics for unit roots. We also conducted HEGY (of Hylleberg, Engle, 
Granger, and Yoo [1992]) tests for stochastic seasonality to guide us in our choice of 
specification. The conclusions drawn from results for Johansen’s test for cointegration 
(see Johansen [1995]) is that there are at least 3 cointegrating relationships for each 
country. We therefore rely on the result of Sims, Stock, and Watson [1990] that sufficient 
cointegrating relationships makes estimation of the time series in levels a valid approach. 
6
 They show that mistakenly estimating in levels will lead to a loss of efficiency whilst 
mistakenly imposing long run conditions is a misspecification; differencing discards any 
long run information that may be there. We believe that risking at most an efficiency loss 
is the best option. 
 
4. MODELLING STRATEGY 
The standard VAR models as proposed by Sims [1980] were an alternative to large scale 
macroeconometric models and do not rely on “incredible” identifying assumptions. The 
main critique of VAR models centres on the fact that the model fit the data at the expense 
of theoretical consistency, both from a short and long run perspective. The original 
atheoretical VARs use a Choleski decomposition to get impulse responses; a Choleski 
decomposition implies a causal ordering that may itself be incredible if the researcher 
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wishes to look at the effects of more than just monetary shocks. Structural VAR (SVAR) 
models explicitly provide an economic or informational rationale behind the restrictions 
necessary to identify monetary and other shocks (see Bernanke [1986], Sims [1986] and 
Blanchard and Quah [1989]). Within a SVAR framework we examine the effects of a 100 
basis points shock to the money market interest rate and also the effects of a one percent 
shock to equity prices. 7 
 Our structure is based upon that of Kim and Roubini [2000] and Brischetto and 
Voss [1999]. We amend the model slightly to include equity. To understand the model it 
will be useful to summarize the VAR modelling process. Our aim is to be able to say 
what effect changes in one variable have on the other variables. This requires that we 
identify the structural form of the model wherein each element in the error term is 
contemporaneously uncorrelated with the others, in other words one must orthogonalise 
the error term (equation 1). 
 
tt uBe 0=      (1) 
( ) tt eyLB =      (2) 
 
Where et is the vector of structural shocks and ut is the vector of reduced form errors. 
Equation 2 shows the structural form of the model in moving average form with B(L) an 
infinite order lag polynomial. In VAR modelling, though, one first estimates the reduced 
form as an autoregression as in equation 3.  
 
( ) ttt uyLAy +=     (3) 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
6
 Exact test statistics for all tests mentioned are available on request. 
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Here, A(L) is a finite order lag polynomial. The following three equations illustrate the 
link between the reduced form and the structural form. 
 
( ) ( )LBBLB 00 +=     (4) 





−− Λ=Σ BB      (6) 
 
Equation 4 splits the infinite order lag polynomial from the structural form into the 
contemporaneous correlations, B0, and the lagged correlations. Equation 5 maps each 
reduced form coefficient matrix onto its structural form counterpart. This can be done 
simply if the researcher knows the B0 matrix of contemporaneous correlations. B0 is 
identified through the unrestricted covariance matrix of the reduced form, Σ, and the 
diagonal covariance matrix of the structural form, Λ, as in equation 6. This, 
unfortunately, does not uniquely identify B0; there are many matrices that satisfy equation 
6. In order to identify the structural form of the model the researcher must place 
additional restrictions somewhere in the model: we use contemporaneous restrictions on 
the B0 matrix to identify the shocks as in equation 7. 
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 A shock to equity prices is just a movement in equity prices that is not predicted by the 
autoregressive system we have estimated. It may come from new information regarding future 


















































































































































   (7) 
Kim and Roubini base their identification strategy upon a model of the macro-
economy based upon optimising agents developed by Sims and Zha [1995]; so do we. 
Hence, it will be instructive for us to explain the salient features of the identification 
strategy.  
The structural model is composed of several blocks. Firstly there are two 
equations describing the money market equilibrium. Money demand is shown in row 5 
and money supply in row 6 of the B0 matrix. Following the discussion in Sims and Zha, 
we assume that monetary policy does not respond contemporaneously to output or prices 
simply because the data isn’t available contemporaneously. Whilst the central bank can 
have a forecast of current output and prices, so does our model. In our model, the interest 
rate equation includes lagged values of all variables, which can be viewed as containing 
an implicit forecast of the current period output and prices. Whilst it is also true that a 
central bank has many more sources of data to base these forecasts upon than we could 
possibly hope to include in a VAR, the most important variables in constructing this 
forecast are likely to be the lagged values of output and prices themselves. These are in 
the information set of the central bank in our model. We allow the central bank to 
respond contemporaneously to the variables that are available contemporaneously: 
commodity prices, money, and the exchange rate. The exceptions to this information rule 
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are the short term foreign interest rate (the Fed  funds rate) and equity prices. We follow 
Kim and Roubini by arguing that the “monetary authority cares more about unexpected 
changes in exchange rate against the US rather than unexpected changes in US interest 
rate per se.” We also assume that the central bank does not respond contemporaneously to 
equity market movements. Again, whilst the central bank can react to the general level 
and speed of change of the equity market through the lagged values, we don’t believe that 
the central bank responds contemporaneously; responding actively to equity prices would 
imply that the central bank thought that equity was either over or undervalued. Our 
money demand equation is standard in that it assumes money demand depends 
contemporaneously on real income and the opportunity cost of holding money. 
Contemporaneous portfolio adjustments from money to equity are assumed to be 
negligible and are treated as zero. 8 
Rows 3 and 4 comprise the domestic goods market equilibrium and the large 
number of zero restrictions in these rows is consistent with a model exhibiting nominal 
rigidities. Commodity prices do, however, enter this block and the rationale behind this 
follows from a cost markup rule for prices as is common in the theoretical literature. 
Rows 1 and 2 are our measure of the external pressures on the economy. As Kim 
and Roubini also explain, “By including the oil price, we control for current systematic 
responses to (negative) supply shocks and inflationary pressure.” We use a broad 
commodity price index instead of the oil price for this. We also include the Fed funds rate 
as a foreign exchange rate in our model. We chose this over a German rate because, as 
Grilli and Roubini [1995] propose, for the G7 countries the US acts as “leader” and the 
other countries are “followers”. Whilst in a European context Germany has been the 
“leader” and the others “followers”, in a global context, those countries that follow 
                                                     
8
 We have also estimated the model allowing for a contemporaneous response of money demand 
to equity prices but the estimated responses of money to equity market shocks were 
unsatisfactorily large. 
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Germany also follow the US if Germany does. Without controlling for US rates, open 
economy VARs often suffer from both the price puzzle and the exchange rate puzzle. 9 
As Grilli and Roubini explain: “Interest rate innovations in the non-US G7 countries 
occur as an endogenous policy reaction to inflationary shocks that cause exchange rate 
depreciation.” Furthermore, we include the Fed funds rate as an endogenous variable for 
all countries even though movements in individual European countries are unlikely to 
have any significant impact on US monetary policy. The alternative would be to treat the 
Fed funds rate as exogenous and allow no impact of Austrian prices on US rates for 
example. Whilst this may look appealing, we are estimating a model for each country 
individually in order to gauge the effects of shocks without saying how correlated these 
shocks are across countries. By treating the Fed funds rate endogenously we allow a 
shock to Austrian prices to be a largely composed of a European shock that would affect 
US policy. In order to be able to isolate solely Austrian price level shocks we would 
conceivably have to control for the movements of many other European variables; this 
would be beyond the scope of a VAR analysis. Furthermore, in the current institutional 
setting (and the one addressed specifically in this paper), it is the response to these 
European level shocks that are of the greatest interest to the asymmetric transmission 
literature. 
The final two rows in our model are the exchange rate and equity prices. The 
exchange rate serves two purposes: allowing the monetary authorities to take into account 
“the effects of a depreciation of their currencies on their inflation rates” and “controlling 
for the components of interest rate movements that are systematic responses to a 
depreciation of the domestic currency, we are more likely to identify the interest rate 
                                                     
9
 The price puzzle is the term given to an estimated increase in prices (or inflation) following a 
positive interest rate shock and is a common finding of VAR studies. The exchange rate puzzle is 
the corollary finding for the exchange rate: a fall following a positive interest rate shock. 
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innovations that are true exogenous contractions”. We allow equities to react to all 
information currently available.  
Our choice of the Kim and Roubini model is also driven by the result that, as 
Grilli and Roubini [1996] put it, “the structural VAR approach appears to be quite 
successful in explaining all the puzzles that plagued the recent literature on the effects of 
monetary policy in closed and open economies.” 
Following Kim and Roubini we estimate all models with 6 lags in order that the 
any differences found are not due to modelling differences. 10 This follows from the 
Akaike Information Criterion and Hannan-Quinn tests. The chosen lag length of 6 is 
greater than suggested for most countries but the desire to have a similar model for all 
countries meant we chose the lag length that encompassed all suggested lag lengths. We 
also include dummies in our estimation to take care of seasonal effects. Since the 
restrictions are short run in nature we will focus mainly upon the short run (up to 30 
months) effects of shocks to the variables of interest. 
 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Table A4 contains maximum likelihood tests for the validity of our overidentifying 
restrictions. They are not rejected at the 10% level for any of the countries in our sample 
and some p-values are very high: for example Sweden has a p-value of 0.9899. We 
therefore, proceed with our analysis based upon the models estimated. 
 
Impulse responses 
Impulse responses of output, prices and equity resulting from a 100 basis points increase 
in interest rates are in the Appendix in combination with the impulse responses for output 
                                                     
10
 As a crosscheck we ran the models with different lag lengths for each country and note that this 
did not impact the results materially. 
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and prices resulting from a positive 1% equity market shock. 11 In order not to show 200 
impulse responses, Tables 1 and 2 provide a summary of the main effects resulting from a 
domestic interest rate and equity market shock. The Appendix provides the summary 
results of a foreign interest rate and commodity price shock (Tables A5 and A6).  
 
Output responses to a domestic interest rate shock 
The interest rate shock has a negative effect on output for all countries, although the 
responses are not significant at the 90% level for Austria, Finland, and the UK. With the 
exception of France and Sweden where long run negative effects on output can be 
observed, the responses are hump-shaped as is commonly found in VAR analyses. The 
magnitude of the responses are varied, ranging from a peak effect of just -0.11% in the 
Netherlands to –1.28% in Germany. Interestingly, if one looks at our statistic for output 
loss, the core countries of the euro, except the Netherlands, suffer a similar loss. 12 
 
Table 1: Indicators to compare difference in SVARs to an interest rate shock. The first two columns of 
this table displays the peak effect on output within the first 48 months and lag at which this occurs. The third 
column gives the total output lost in the first 30 months. The final columns show the peak effect within the 














Austria -1.15 3 -10.30 -0.41 2 -12.91 18 
Belgium -0.73 5 -12.04 -0.26 19 -3.43 1 
Finland -0.76 20 -15.96 -0.34 42 -6.78 16 
France -0.68 43 -13.81 -0.16 48 -4.05 2 
Germany -1.28 6 -13.08 -1.13 38 -2.00 1 
Italy -0.38 19 -7.62 0 0 -3.96 14 
Netherlands -0.11 19 -1.79 -0.12 48 -0.83 9 
Spain -0.32 27 -6.93 -0.01 48 -1.34 27 
                                                     
11
 Impulse responses for all other possible shocks are available on request. 
12
 The output loss is calculated as a simple sum of the effect at each point in time over the first 30 
months. The average fall in output is therefore one thirtieth of our statistic. 
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Sweden -0.16 48 -3.11 -0.04 2 -0.99 11 
UK -0.16 4 -1.67 -0.09 35 -0.80 5 
US -1.32 15 -21.32 -0.20 22 -6.55 9 
 
 
Response of prices to a domestic interest rate shock 
After a delay, most countries display a fall in their price levels following the shock. For 
Spain and Sweden the effects are very small and insignificant at the 90% level whilst the 
UK and US responses are larger but still insignificant. Italy displays a price puzzle. For 
the other countries, the responses are largely negative, if in the cases of Finland and the 
Netherlands after a lag, and significantly so for a time. As with the response of output, we 
find that there is a wide variety of magnitudes with Germany the largest and the UK one 
of the smallest. 
 
Response of equity prices to a domestic interest rate shock 
For all countries except Germany, there is a significantly negative response of equity 
prices to the domestic interest rate shock. Once again, the magnitude of the shock varies 
considerably across the countries. Those countries that display the largest falls in their 
equity markets, as measured by the peak fall, are also those that have the largest output 
losses. This is in line with theory that equity markets reflect future output performance. 
 
Table 2: Indicators to compare difference in SVARs to a equity price shock. The first two columns of 
this table display the peak effect on output within the first 48 months and lag at which this occurs. The third 
column gives the cumulative effect on output over the first 30 months. The final columns show the peak 
effect within the first 48 months and lag at which this occurs. 
 Peak effect on output Lag Cumulative output effect 
Austria 0.07 8 1.09 
Belgium 0.05 5 0.35 
Finland 0.07 13 1.05 
France 0.02 18 0.31 
Germany 0.06 32 1.42 
Italy 0.06 1 0.45 
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Netherlands 0.07 4 1.04 
Spain 0.08 22 1.89 
Sweden 0.08 9 0.81 
UK 0.11 21 2.54 
US 0.16 13 3.38 
 
The effects of equity price shocks 
In all countries a positive equity market shock is followed by an increase in output; most 
euro are countries display a peak increase of around 0.06%. The effects in the UK are 
somewhat larger. The positive response is significant at the 90% level for all countries 
except Belgium and France. The effect on prices is more ambiguous and the patterns are 
dissimilar. Apart from Finland, the euro area countries experience falling price levels 
after the equity price shock. Finland, Sweden, the UK, the US, and Japan all experience 
rising price levels. 
 
Our interpretation 
If equity markets really cause inflationary bubbles through excessive spending (an 
increase in aggregate demand), we would have expected to see positive responses of 
prices to equity market innovations; for the euro area we do not. We interpret the fall in 
prices as evidence of lower costs of external finance, if evidence of anything at all. With 
integrated financial markets around the world it would seem that our 1% equity market 
shock is a response to an expected increase in future output with a peak of around 0.06 – 
0.07% with a similar discount rate across the countries. The exception is the UK where 
not only is there an increase in prices following the equity price shock, but also a larger 
increase in output. This evidence is more consistent with a balance sheet effect. 
 
Responses to external shocks 
For most countries the effect of a positive shock to the Fed funds rate is either minimal or 
a fall in output. This, again, varies across the countries in our sample. Prices fall 
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following the Fed funds shock whilst equity prices generally mimic the output responses. 
Commodity price shocks increase price levels across the board and also lower equity 
markets; both sets of responses have reasonably similar orders of magnitude. 
 
Variance decompositions 
In general output remains dominant in the variance decomposition of output. In Spain, the 
UK and the US the proportion of the forecast error attributable to the equity market 
increases through time, especially in the UK. We interpret this as further evidence that 
equity markets drive output in the UK. In euro area money and/or the exchange rate 
become more important. The forecast error variances for prices tell a similar story. There 
is some minor evidence of an effect of equity on inflation for Belgium, Finland, Italy and 
Sweden, but only after 30 months. Interestingly, the price decomposition for Germany 
really shows how successful the Bundesbank policy of controlling monetary growth has 
been over the sample period with money and interest rates accounting for the majority of 
price variations at long horizons. This is less so for the other euro area countries and 
especially so for the US. This calls into question the first pillar of the ECB policy strategy 
of focusing on monetary growth, whilst this is important for Germany it is not so for the 
rest of the euro area. 
Decomposing the variance in interest rates makes clear that changes in interest 
rates themselves and in money supply are the dominant factors. Barring Austria and 
Belgium, equity markets hardly play a role. And even in these markets, the effects occur 
with very long lags. This strongly suggests that monetary policy does not respond to 
equity market volatility. Finally we note that large equity markets (UK, US and 
Germany) are driven by their own dynamics according to our variance decompositions. In 





Since we find asymmetric responses to the monetary shocks it is of interest to ask why? 
Using the main results from the impulse responses (Tables 1 and 2) and the financial 
development indicators from Rajan and Zingales [2003] for the year ending 2000 we 
looked for relationships between financial structure and the size of the responses. We do 
so by calculating the Spearman’s non-parametric correlations. These correlations are 
displayed in Tables 3 and 4. 
Using a 5% significance level, we find three key relationships for interest rate 
shocks and one relation for equity market shocks. Firstly, a relation between the peak 
effect on output and equity issuance. The less developed the equity market, the larger the 
peak effect. Secondly, a relation between the lag at which the peak effect of output occurs 
and the bank loans and deposits ratio. The larger the size of the banking system, the 
sooner the dip in output occurs. Thirdly, we find a positive relationship between market 
capitalisation with the lag at which inflation dips. This suggests that inflation peaks 
sooner if the banking system is less important. We do not put much emphasis on this as 
we note that the relation between timing and bank loans is borderline significant. Finally, 
there is a clear relation between the peak effect on output and the market capitalisation 
and number of companies. The larger and deeper the equity markets, the smaller the peak 
effect of an equity market shock. 
 
Table 3: Interest rate shocks and financial structure. The table presents Spearman’s correlation 
coefficients between impulse response statistics to interest rate shocks and financial structure statistics from 
Rajan and Zingales [2003]. Asterixes in parenthesis denote significance at a 5% (*) or 1% (**) level.  






Peak output 0.127 0.118 0.391 0.527 (*) 0.436 
Timing -0.624 (*) -0.729 (**) 0.105 0.497 0.346 
Output loss 0.073 0.036 0.318 0.291 0.382 
Peak price level  -0.383 -0.433 0.073 0.255 0.260 
Timing 0.510 0.409 0.161 0.579 (*) 0.055 
Peak equity market 0.364 0.464 0.136 0.445 0.418 
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Timing -0.237 -0.433 0.246 0.278 0.100 
 
 
Table 4: Equity market shocks and financial structure. The table presents Spearman’s correlation 
coefficients between impulse response statistics to equity shocks and financial structure statistics from Rajan 
and Zingales [2003]. Asterixes in parenthesis denote significance at a 5% (*) or 1% (**) level.  




Number of companies 
Peak output -0.115 -0.189 0.581(*) 0.512 0.677 (*) 
Timing 0.196 0.128 -0.032 0.237 0.223 
Output gain 0.200 0.082 0.309 0.273 0.309 
 
These findings are straightforward; countries where the private sector borrows a 
larger amount at interest are affected sooner by changes in interest rates. The relative 
availability of alternate finance sources is important in cushioning the effects interest rate 
shocks. This is compatible with the existence of a credit channel whereby the availability 
of equity finance reduces the special nature of bank lending. All in all, our findings 
suggest that financial structure is important for the transmission of monetary policy 
shocks and that the split is between those countries traditionally thought to have bank 
based financial systems and those that have market based systems. Within the euro area 




We have estimated an eight variable structural vector autoregression in order to 
investigate the role played by equity markets in the monetary transmission mechanism. 
Our model largely avoids the oft-found price puzzle. Across the euro area countries we 
find that positive equity market shocks have a similar positive effect on output, but do not 
have a positive effect on prices. We interpret this as evidence against an equity wealth 
effect. The only country where this pattern breaks down is the UK, displaying a positive 
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response of prices to equity market shocks and larger output responses. Variance 
decompositions also suggest that the shocks driving the series studied are different among 
the euro area group and the UK and the US. 
The responses to interest rate shocks are asymmetric across the countries in our 
sample. Within the EU, the smallest output loss occurs in the UK and the Netherlands, 
with the largest occurring in Finland. French and German output losses are close to those 
of Finland. The responses of output are smaller in those countries that have a large equity 
issuance suggesting that the availability of differing sources of external finance is 
important in the transmission mechanism. The responses of prices and output to the 
monetary shock are related to the volume of bank lending to the private sector which is 
intuitively appealing: interest rate changes have bigger effects where more funds are 
borrowed at interest. 
In terms of the channels of monetary transmission we find no evidence of an 
equity channel in the euro area. In the Euro area, central banks do not take explicit 
account of equity markets when setting monetary policy. Nor should do, as equity 
markets do not seem to interfere with the objective of price stability. We do, however, 
find some evidence across our sample to suggest that equity markets can play a role by 
providing substitute sources of external finance to bank loans, thus diminishing the effect 
of any possible bank lending channel. 
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Table A 1: Indicators of financial development. The second to fourth column or this table show bank loans 
to the private sector, deposits and equity market capitalisation as ratio to GDP. Market capitalisation is the 
aggregate market value of equity of domestic companies. Equity issues are the ratio of funds raised through 
public equity offerings (both initial public offerings and seasoned equity issues) to gross fixed capital 
formation. Number of companies is the ratio of number of domestic companies whose equity is publicly 
traded in a domestic equity market and the countries population is millions. Data is displayed for the year 
ending 1980. 
 Bank loans to 
private sector 
Deposits Equity market 
capitalisation 
Equity issues Number of 
companies 
Austria 0.724 0.682 0.030 0.000 8.740 
Belgium 0.272 0.299 0.090 0.030 22.850 
Denmark 0.244 0.276 0.090 0.010 42.540 
Finland 0.462 0.391 n.a. 0.012 n.a. 
France 0.731 0.679 0.090 0.060 13.990 
Germany 0.864 0.564 0.090 0.010 7.460 
Greece 0.520 0.507 0.085 n.a. n.a. 
Ireland 0.315 0.577 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Italy 0.555 0.676 0.070 0.040 2.360 
Luxembourg 1.210 1.626 0.001 0.016 205.556 
Netherlands 0.632 0.602 0.190 0.10. 15.120 
Portugal 0.855 0.946 0.006 n.a. n.a. 
Spain n.a. 0.723 0.087 0.028 13.213 
Sweden 0.415 0.510 0.110 0.000 12.390 
Average  0.601 0.647 0.078 0.020 34.422 
UK 0.276 0.280 0.380 0.040 47.220 
US 0.354 0.540 0.460 0.040 23.110 
Source: Rajan and Zingales [2003]. 
 26
Table A 2: Indicators of financial development. The second to fourth column or this table show bank loans 
to the private sector, deposits and equity market capitalisation as ratio to GDP. Market capitalisation is the 
aggregate market value of equity of domestic companies. Equity issues are the ratio of a three-year average 
(1999 – 2001) of funds raised through public equity offerings (both initial public offerings and seasoned 
equity issues) to gross fixed capital formation. Number of companies is the ratio of number of domestic 
companies whose equity is publicly traded in a domestic equity market and the countries population in 
millions. Data is displayed for the year ending 2000. 
 Bank loans to 
private sector 
Deposits Equity market 
capitalisation 
Equity issues Number of 
companies 
Austria 1.040 0.819 1.156 0.051 11.975 
Belgium 0.792 0.837 0.783 0.138 15.707 
Finland 0.534 0.464 2.383 0.497 29.730 
France 0.864 0.636 1.087 0.145 13.720 
Germany 1.207 0.925 0.668 0.065 9.071 
Greece 0.526 0.566 0.942 0.430 30.869 
Ireland 1.069 0.793 0.843 0.172 20.053 
Italy 0.770 0.514 0.703 0.041 5.058 
Luxembourg 1.099 3.367 1.771 0.494 122.727 
Netherlands 1.398 0.937 1.701 0.629 14.754 
Portugal 1.408 0.997 0.567 0.502 10.889 
Spain 1.012 0.816 0.882 0.866 25.817 
Sweden 0.457 0.391 1.476 0.289 32.920 
Average  0.937 0.930 1.046 0.322 27.530 
UK 1.320 1.069 1.840 0.149 32.370 
US 0.493 0.379 1.549 0.207 25.847 
Average 0.907 0.724 1.694 0.178 29.109 
Source: Rajan and Zingales [2003]. 
 
 27
Table A 3: Composition of external funding. The table shows the percentage share of loans, bonds, equity 
and other forms of external funding for the non-financial corporate sector. Other includes trade credit and 
advances and other liabilities. The final column displays the total external funding as percentage of GDP. 
Data is displayed for the year ending 2000. 
 Loans Bonds Equity Other Total external 
funding to GDP 
Austria 69.3 7.0 21.3 2.4 24.7 
Belgium 21.1 2.6 73.8 2.5 221.6 
Finland 18.7 2.3 74.5 4.5 379.5 
France 10.4 3.6 57.0 7.9 278.5 
Germany 37.6 1.5 48.6 12.3 81.9 
Italy 29.7 1.1 54.5 14.8 103.3 
Netherlands 32.0 3.9 53.0 11.1 162.7 
Portugal 33.1 4.0 42.0 20.9 107.7 
Spain 21.4 1.2 54.6 22.8 155.8 
US 19.0 14.0 67.0 n.a. 210.0 
Source: European Central Bank [2003]: Report on financial structures (Table 5.1) and US Federal Flow of 
Funds. 
 
Table A 4: Tests for the validity of overidentifying restrictions. Likelihood ratio tests for the validity of 
overidentifying restrictions with p-	
2 distribution with 5 degrees of freedom (4 for Italy).  
 Test statistic P-Value 
Austria 4.1888 0.5226 
Belgium 5.6664 0.3400 
Finland 2.3694 0.7960 
France 1.4042 0.9239 
Germany 6.2458 0.2830 
Italy 7.2016 0.1256 
Netherlands 3.0801 0.6876 
Spain 7.9595 0.1585 
Sweden 0.5561 0.9899 
UK 3.7739 0.5824 
US 1.9388 0.8576 
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Figure A 1: SVAR Impulse response of output to a 100 basis points interest rate shock. The horizontal 
axis gives the number of months after the shock. The vertical axis gives the responses in percentage changes. 
Confidence intervals are bootstrapped 90% intervals generated using Hall’s method. 
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Figure A 2: SVAR Impulse response of the price level to a 100 basis points interest rate shock. The 
horizontal axis gives the number of months after the shock. The vertical axis gives the responses in 
percentage changes. Confidence intervals are bootstrapped 90% intervals generated using Hall’s method. 
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Figure A 3: SVAR Impulse response of equity prices to a 100 basis points interest rate shock. The 
horizontal axis gives the number of months after the shock. The vertical axis gives the responses in 
percentage changes. Confidence intervals are bootstrapped 90% intervals generated using Hall’s method. 
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Figure A 4: SVAR Impulse response of output to a 1 percent equity market shock. The horizontal axis 
gives the number of months after the shock. The vertical axis gives the responses in percentage changes. 
Confidence intervals are bootstrapped 90% intervals generated using Hall’s method. 
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Figure A 5: SVAR Impulse response of the price level to a 1 percent equity market shock. The 
horizontal axis gives the number of months after the shock. The vertical axis gives the responses in 
percentage changes. Confidence intervals are bootstrapped 90% intervals generated using Hall’s method. 
Austria Belgium Finland 
   
France Germany Italy 
   
Netherlands Spain Sweden 
   


















































































































0 6 12 18 24 30 36 42 48
 33
Table A 5: Indicators to compare difference in SVARs to a foreign interest rate shock. The first two 
columns of this table displays the peak effect on output within the first 48 months and lag at which this 
occurs. The third column gives the total output lost in the first 30 months. The final columns show the peak 














Austria -0.23 17 -4.60 -0.15 48 -2.09 29 
Belgium -0.11 1 1.51 -0.04 7 -0.63 6 
Finland -0.47 48 -4.95 0.00 0 -1.14 48 
France -0.01 48 0.31 -0.01 7 0.07 48 
Germany -0.01 14 0.73 -0.06 47 0.27 48 
Italy -0.35 22 -5.17 -0.01 2 -1.06 13 
Netherlands -0.30 35 -6.24 -0.02 3 -1.52 43 
Spain -0.21 30 -5.10 -0.03 1 -1.22 23 
Sweden -0.72 26 -6.78 -0.03 6 -1.86 20 
UK -0.03 1 1.06 -0.09 48 -0.35 3 
US -0.78 24 -13.68 -0.12 48 -1.09 38 
 
Table A 6: Indicators to compare difference in SVARs to a commodity price shock. The first two 
columns of this table display the peak effect on prices within the first 48 months and lag at which this occurs. 
The third and final column show the peak effect on equity prices within the first 48 months and lag at which 
this occurs. 
 Peak effect on 
Prices 
Lag Peak effect on 
Equity Prices 
Lag 
Austria 0.06 8 -0.19 5 
Belgium 0.03 6 -0.39 5 
Finland 0.01 2 -1.86 13 
France 0.04 29 -0.59 11 
Germany 0.06 32 -1.09 5 
Italy 0.06 24 -1.45 10 
Netherlands 0.05 30 -0.61 8 
Spain 0.04 6 -0.76 2 
Sweden 0.05 1 -0.31 5 
UK 0.11 22 -0.65 5 
US 0.05 21 -1.16 8 
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Figure A 6: Variance decompositions. This figure displays the percentage of the forecast error for the main 
variables output, prices, interest rates and equity prices. Forecasts errors due to equity prices are shown for 
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